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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose an efficient bilateral remote user authentication scheme with smart cards. 
Our scheme ensures both-way authentication, so that any attempt of the adversary to affect the secure 
communications between the authentication server and the user could not be successful. We also 
present a brief analysis of our proposed scheme and show that it is well-resistant against the known 
attacks in remote user authentication process. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  The possible use of insecure channels during the 
communications in a remote user authentication 
process necessitates the exploitation of competent 
security mechanisms for the exchanged information 
between the remote system and the user. Many of the 
previously proposed schemes like [1], [2], [3], [4] 
etc. concentrate on unilateral authentication where 
the server messages are considered to be fully 
secured and only the user’ s validity is verified. With 
the increasing use of remote login systems in 
banking, e-commerce applications and distributed 
networking, use of efficient methods for remote 
authentication have become imperative. To deal with 
this issue, in this paper, we propose a new mutual 
authentication scheme in which both the participating 
entities verify each other’ s authenticity. 
  The structure of this paper is as follows: Following 
the Section 1, Section 2 states the basic terms and 
preliminaries for our scheme, Section 3 presents our 
bilateral authentication scheme, Section 4 presents a 
brief cryptanalysis of our scheme and Section 5 
concludes the paper with future research directions. 
 
2. BASIC TERMS AND PRELIMINARIES 
 
  LU-decomposition [5] underpins the authentication 
process of our scheme. LU-decomposition is a 
procedure for decomposing a square matrix A (N ×N) 
into a product of a lower triangular matrix L and an 
upper triangular matrix U, such that, A = LU, where, L 
and U have the forms,  
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  So, for example, for a square matrix of dimension 4 
× 4, equation A=LU, looks like: 
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  According to the definition, elementary matrix E is 
an N × N matrix if it can be obtained from the identity 
matrix In by using one and only one elementary row 
operation (e.g., elimination, scaling, or interchange) 
[7]. Elementary row operations are, ji RR ↔ , 
ii RcR ↔ , iji RcRR ↔+ . If the elementary 
matrices corresponding to the row operations that we 
use are, E1, E2 ….. Ek, then, Ek….E2E1A = U. Hence, A 
= (Ek….E2E1)-1U or L = E 1−k … E 12− E 11− . 
 
3. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
3.1 Pre-Processing 
  Before applying our scheme, a large pool of keys 
with size s is generated offline. This pool of huge 
number of keys is used for the formation of a secret 
symmetric key matrix A ( NN × ) which is stored by the 
server. N also indicates the maximum number of 
users that could be supported by the symmetric 
matrix. Each element Aij of A is assigned a distinct 
key from the key pool (generated earlier) such that Aij 
= Aji for, i,j = N,1 . Now, LU-decomposition is 
applied on matrix A to divide it into the lower 
triangular matrix L and upper triangular matrix U. As A 
is symmetric, the multiplication of the xth row of L  
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and yth column of U (Kxy) generates the same value 
as the multiplication of yth row of L and xth column of 
U (Kyx) generates. 
 
3.2 Details of Our Scheme 
User Registration Phase. We assume that, this phase 
occurs over a secure channel. Let Fh be a secure 
one-way hash function [6] which produces 64 bit 
outputs. A one-way function is a transfer function f 
where given p, it is fairly easy to compute, q = f(p) in 
the forward direction, but given q, it is 
computationally very difficult to find out a p using the 
inverse such that, p = f--1(q). 
In the registration phase, the user Ua first submits 
his identity (IDa) and arbitrarily chosen password PWa 
to the KIC (Key Information Center, which is a part of 
the AS) for registration. In turn the KIC associated 
with the AS does the following steps: 
  1. Generates two random numbers x and y within 
the range N (the dimension of the matrices). 
  2. It selects the xth row from L matrix LR(x), xth 
column from U matrix UC(x), and yth column from U 
matrix UC(y). 
  3. Computes, LR(x) ×  UC(y) = Kxy and θ = Fh(IDa ⊕ 
Kxy) ⊕ PWa where ⊕ denotes a bitwise Exclusive-OR 
(XOR) operation. 
  4. Issues a smart card containing (Fh, Kxy, ν, UC(x), 
θ) to the user, where ν = ( yφ ⊕ ) with ϕ is an 
arbitrary number which is kept secret and owned by 
AS. Same value of ϕ is used for all the users to be 
served by the Authentication Server. 
  It should be mentioned that, for all the calculations, 
64 bit outputs are used and variable length inputs are 
made 64 bits using padding. In fact, the user can 
choose the password PWa and identity IDa according 
to his own will but shorter length inputs are made the 
same length as the key Kxy (64 bits) using padding. 
Login & Bilateral Authentication Phase. When the user 
needs to login to the remote system, he attaches the 
smart card to the input device and keys in his identity 
IDa and password PWa.  
  The smart card performs the following operations: 
  1. Generates a random number r with the same 
length of Kxy and computes Ha = Kxy ⊕ Fh(r), and 
computes, Sa = θ ⊕ PWa ⊕ r. 
  2. Sends the login request message, M = (IDa, Ha, ν, 
UC(x), Sa, T), (here, T is the current timestamp) to the 
Authentication Server. 
  After receiving the login request message M, the 
server performs the operations: 
  1. Checks the validity of IDa. If the format is different 
than the allowed format, it rejects the request. 
  2. Tests the time interval (T′ - T) ≤ ΔT, where T′ is 
the timestamp of receiving the message M and ΔT is 
the maximum allowed time interval for transmission 
delay. If ΔT is greater than its boundary condition, the 
request is rejected. 
  3. Now Authentication Server computes, ( φ⊕ν ) 
which eventually generates the value of y for that 
user. AS now knows which row is to be selected from 
the L matrix for this particular user and selects the yth 
row LR(y) and computes, LR(y)×UC(x) = Kyx  
  4. Computes t = Fh(IDa ⊕ Kyx), and r′ = t ⊕ Sa. 
  5. Computes, Kxy′ = Ha ⊕ Fh(r′), which is expected to 
generate the value of Kxy = Kxy′ for a legitimate user, 
as in the previous step r′ should be equal to the 
random number (r) generated by the user for this 
particular login request. 
  6. Now the server checks whether the condition, Kxy 
= Kyx holds or not. If it does not hold, the server 
detects the user Ua as an invalid user otherwise, 
detects as a valid user. For the invalid user(s) the 
server rejects the login request and for the legitimate 
user(s) it proceeds to the next steps. 
  7. Computes M′ = Fh(Kyx X-NOR T′′), where T′′ is the 
current timestamp, X-NOR means the bitwise 
Exclusive-NOR (XNOR) operation and sends (M′ , 
T′′) to the user Ua. Upon receiving the message M′ 
from the AS, the user Ua follows the steps: 
  1. Verifies the boundary condition, T′′′-T′′ ≤ ΔT, 
where T′′′ is the timestamp of receiving the message 
M′.  
  2. Then it computes, Fh(Kxy X-NOR T′′) and if it 
equals to the received M′, the user verifies the 
legitimacy of the Authentication Server.  
  As a symmetric matrix is used for LU-
decomposition, Kxy=Kyx and the procedure works for 
the legitimate authentication server and user. Thus, 
our scheme ensures bilateral verification. 
Password Renewal. When a legitimate user wants to 
renew his password, the following operations are 
done.  
  The user enters both the old and new password for 
changing his password. Let, PWa′ is the new 
password chosen by the user instead of the old 
password, PWa. Then, the server computes: 
  1. θ′ = θ ⊕ PWa ⊕ PWa′ 
         = Fh(IDa ⊕ Kxy) ⊕ PWa ⊕ PWa ⊕ PWa′ 
  2. Replaces θ with θ′ in the smart card. 
  It should be noted that, like the registration phase, 
password renewal phase takes place over a secure 
channel.   
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 4   CRYPTANALYSIS OF OUR SCHEME 
 
  The underlying common secret key between the 
user and the authentication server is formed in our 
method, on the basis of LU-decomposition. The 
basic idea is to pre-store part of the information in 
the smart card so that it could be used to calculate 
the required information thus to help for the mutual 
verification in the remote authentication process. As 
mentioned earlier, the communications in the login 
and authentication phases are occurred over insecure 
channels. Many of the proposed schemes in this area 
have been found vulnerable because of the reason 
that, the attackers first listen to the exchanged 
messages, then using some computations try to 
deduce the secret information. Hence, the messages 
that are exchanged between the user and the 
authentication server must be well-protected or 
cryptic so that the adversary cannot use the 
information to draw any of the secret information for 
any sort of attack. 
  In the login phase in our scheme, the user sends the 
login request message, M = (IDa, Ha, ν, UC(x), Sa, T). 
From this message an attacker cannot find any useful 
information that it can exploit for finding out the 
secret common key Kxy (or Kyx). Basically, in this 
message, Ha contains the information about the 
secret key that is to be tested, ν carries the 
information about the specific row information that is 
to be selected by the server so that the symmetric 
key could be generated by the multiplication 
operation. As the randomly generated value r is used 
to compute Ha, this value changes from session to 
session and it is very difficult for the adversary to 
derive the key from this value without knowing the 
exact value of r used for that particular session. 
Another parameter Sa contains the random value r 
which is computed before deriving the secret key 
value.  In fact, it is easy to see that, r′ = t ⊕ Sa = 
Fh(IDa ⊕ Kyx) ⊕ Fh(IDa ⊕ Kxy) ⊕ PWa ⊕ PWa ⊕ r = r. 
  For the legitimate users, Kxy must be equal to Kyx 
and will eventually cancelled out to generate the value 
of the random number used in that particular session. 
The attacker can get the value of UC(x) but without 
knowing the corresponding row information, it has no 
way to generate the secret common key. 
  Our scheme is resistant to replay attacks [8] as 
replaying an old login request message will be 
detected in the step 2 of authentication process in  
the server. Masquerading or Impersonation attack 
could not be launched against our scheme as the 
adversaries have no way to derive the secret 
information of a valid user. The only possible 
limitation of our scheme is that, the number of users 
that could be supported by the server is restricted by 
the dimension of the secret symmetric matrix.  
 
5   CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a new and efficient 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards 
which ensures bilateral authentication so that both the 
parties participating in the process could verify each 
other’ s validity. Our scheme also supports password 
renewal by the user. As our future work, we would like 
to investigate how to improve the efficiency of our 
scheme in terms of computational costs and memory 
usage. 
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